Foreward:  Why Retry? Reviving Dormant Racial Justice Claims by Minow, Martha Louise
 
Foreward:  Why Retry? Reviving Dormant Racial Justice
Claims
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Martha L. Minow, Foreward:  Why Retry? Reviving Dormant
Racial Justice Claims, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1133 (2003).
Accessed February 19, 2015 5:15:14 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12343476
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-
of-use#LAAFOREWORD:  WHY RETRY?  REVIVING
DORMANT RACIAL JUSTICE CLAIMS
Martha Minow*
"A patched and leaky vase may be less desirable than an unbroken vase,
but it is better than a pile of shards."
- Marc Galanter'
Two  familiar  arguments oppose  lawsuits  and  legislative  efforts  to
address  racial  injustices  from  our  national  past,2  and  a  third  tacit
argument  can be discerned.  "Why open  old wounds?":  this question
animates the first argument. The evidence is stale - this expresses the
second argument. The third, less explicit objection reflects worries that
exposing some  gross  and  unremedied  racial  injustices  from  the  past
will reveal the scale  of imperfections in the systems of justice and gov-
ernment  and  thereby undermine  the legitimacy  of those systems. To
introduce  the meticulous  and passionate  essays  in this Colloquium,  I
elaborate  and  respond  to  each  of  these  questions.  Like  the
Colloquium authors, I think it far more important that public attention
come to these  issues than that any particular remedy be secured. For
inattention has been the insult laid upon the injuries of the past.
I.  WHY OPEN OLD WOUNDS?
Reopening  old wounds is treated  as an argument against litigation
when time has passed since the underlying events. To some, even two
years  can  seem like  sufficient  time  for  injuries  to recede  into a  past
that  should  not be  disturbed.  One  editorial  writer  recently  urged  a
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1.  Marc Galanter, Righting Old Wrongs, in MARTHA  MINOW,  BREAKING  THE CYCLES
OF HATRED  107, 124 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2002).
2.  In  2001,  the criminal  justice  system  prosecuted Thomas  Blanton  for  the  deaths  of
Denise  McNair,  Carole  Robertson,  Cynthia  Wesley,  and  Addie  Mae  Collins,  four  young
African-American  girls,  in  the  bombing  of  a  Birmingham,  Alabama  church.  Robert
Chambliss was also convicted of the bombing in 1977. See Stephanie McCrummen,  The  Ver-
dict. Guilty: Jury Convicts Man in '63  Church Bombing  That Killed 4 Girls, NEWSDAY  (Long
Island),  May  23, 2002,  at  A7.  For  detailed consideration  of this  and  similar  efforts,  see
Anthony V. Alfieri, Retrying Race, 101  MICH. L. REV. 1141  (2003); Richard Delgado,  White
Interests and Civil Rights Realism:  Rodrigo's Bittersweet Epiphany, 101 MICH.  L. REV.  1201
(2003);  Margaret  M.  Russell,  Cleansing  Moments  and  Retrospective Justice,  101  MICH.  L.
REV. 1225  (2003); and  Eric K. Yamamoto et al.,  American Racial Justice on Trial - Again:
African  American  Reparations, Human  Rights, and the  War on  Terror,  101  MICH.  L. REV.
1269 (2003).
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district  attorney  to  drop  a  potential  prosecution  that  arose  when  a
homeless couple accidentally started a fire in a vacant  warehouse that
led to the death of six firefighters.3 "All a trial would  accomplish  now
is  to reopen  old  wounds  in  a  city  that  has  already  spent  two  years
grieving."4
In  that  situation,  the  pursuit  of  justice  seems  to  interrupt  or
undermine a process of mourning, a process that involves ceremonies,
memorials, grief, and private memory.  Though blame could be found,
the editorial  argued that the wrongdoers  needed no trial because they
already suffered  "the  hell  of living  with what  they have  done."6 This
notion  that  wrongdoers  have  suffered  enough,  however,  is  absent
when  the  underlying  harms  arose  not  by  negligence  but  hate,  and
when the wrongdoers  actually  boast about their behavior  and  remain
unrepentant.
Sometimes the worry about reopening old wounds comes with the
acknowledgment  that the conflicts  are still raw.  Proposed  trials could
"reopen  old  wounds  and  plunge  the  country  back  into  civil  war,"
commented  one  observer after representatives  of the  United Nations
withdrew  from  plans  to  set  up  a  special  court  to  prosecute  former
leaders  of  the  Khmer  Rouge  for  1.7  million  deaths  in  Cambodia
during the 1970s.7 Although the underlying events reach back several
decades, civil war persisted until 1998.'  It seems therefore a bit odd to
talk  of "old  wounds."  Perhaps  people  warn  against  reopening  the
conflicts precisely because they are so fresh and barely ended. In other
words,  arguments  against  opening  old  wounds  - whether  in
Cambodia, the United  States, or elsewhere  - may stand in for worry
about current social  disorder and  the fragility  of peace.  Yet  however
uncomfortable  discussions  of the  racial  past  may  be in  this country,
can there be any honest worry about social instability if we  address the
old  wounds  concerning  racial  violence  of  the  1960s  and  1970s?  Of
course, addressing  past  racial  violence  has  a bearing  on the  present
day  examinations  of  affirmative  action,  racial  profiling,  and  other
social policies, but basic peace and social order are not in jeopardy.
Some worry that assessing past incidents risks undermining current
efforts  to  build  trust across  racial  lines.  Shootings  killed  two  white
3.  Adrian Walker, A Trial For What?, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 1,  2002, at B1.
4.  /d.
5.  Id.
6.  Id.
7.  Irwin Arieff Ta Mok,  UN Walks Out of  Cambodia  Talks on  War Crimes  Courts, THE
INDEPENDENT  (London), Feb. 9,2002, at 13.  Cambodian  and U.N. negotiators  subsequently
reached a  tentative agreement to create a tribunal to prosecute former  Khmer Rouge  lead-
ers  for genocide.  See  Ellen Nakashima,  Pact Raises Hope  in  Cambodia for Khmer  Rouge
Trials, WASH. POST, Mar. 18,2003, at A26.
8.  Mok, supra note 7.
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police  officers  and  a black  youth,  allegedly  a gang  member,  over  a
two-week period in August of 2002 in Minneapolis, Minnesota.'  Given
long-standing  friction  between  white  police  officers  and  African
Americans  in  Minneapolis,  one  editorial  warned  that  evaluation  of
each  incident  would  risk  reopening  memories  of  prior  incidents,
clouding judgments about the present, and dissolving current efforts to
build  trust between  the police and  the community.'  Once again,  this
kind  of worry cannot  be raised in  the notable  recent efforts  to bring
litigation  or  seek  reparations  concerning  civil  rights  abuses  of  the
1960s and  1970s or slavery. Indeed,  it is  precisely  because  of growing
trust and real progress toward fairness and objectivity  in the local legal
systems  that current-day  efforts  turn to these  systems  for redress  for
unremedied racial injustices.
Perhaps  criminal prosecutions or any kind of adversarial  litigation
hold  special jeopardy  for  opening  old  wounds  from  racial  injustice.
This  point  animates  some  features  of  the  restorative  justice  move-
ment, an international effort  of theorists  and practitioners,  to engage
victims and community members with wrongdoers  in  forward-looking
processes of justice-seeking reparations and healing."  Is it a legitimate
concern  that  focusing  the  machinery  of justice  on past,  unremedied
racial  harms  could  produce  pain  for  the  perpetrators?  Racial  riots
ripped  York,  Pennsylvania,  in  1969,  wounding  sixty  people;  a  white
mob  killed  Lillie  Belle  Allen,  a  preacher's  daughter.2  Despite  the
filing of criminal charges, the prosecutions lay dormant for thirty years
until local newspapers  revived the matter; prosecutors  then reopened
the  investigation.  One  man,  apparently  involved  in  killing  Allen,
called to assist the prosecutors but then committed suicide. 1 3
The costs of adversarial justice might seem unwarranted  if repara-
tions and healing are genuine  alternatives.  But what are the possibili-
ties  for  personal  and  communal  healing  after  racial  violence?  This
question animates  the international  restorative justice  movement.  Its
9.  Editorial,  Take  A  Breath: Cops,  Community  Must  Work  Together,  STAR  TRIB.
(Minneapolis),  Aug. 17,2002, at 20A.
10.  Id.
11.  See RESTORATIVE  JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Burt  Gallaway & Joe
Hudson eds., 1996); Elizabeth  Latif, Note, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating  Apologies Tailored
Toward Legal Solutions, 81  B.U.  L. REV.  289, 292-93  (2001)  (summarizing  the restorative
justice movement).
12.  Ex-Mayor Acquitted, 2 Convicted in '69 Race Killing, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 20,2002,
at B07; see also Combined  News Services, Still Guilty in Some  Eyes:  Town Divided in Ac-
quittal of Mayor in 1969 York Race Riot, NEWSDAY,  Oct. 21,2002, at A12; Jennifer McMen-
amin, 2 Convicted in York  Case Handed Prison  Sentences: Pair  of White Men Guilty in Black
Woman's Death Get at Least 4 1/2, 9 Years, BALT. SUN, Dec. 19, 2002, at 3A.
13.  McMenamin, supra note  12. One of the police  officers at the time,  Charlie Robert-
son, later admitted that  he shouted  "white  power"  at  a  gang  rally. Others  blamed  him for
encouraging gunmen to shoot blacks during the riots. Robertson later was elected  mayor for
two terms; he also later apologized for his earlier racial views. Id.
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adherents  argue  that  restoring  the  dignity  of  individuals  and  the
harmony of communities  should be the goal of justice. Exemplified by
the  South  African  Truth  and  Reconciliation  Commission  ("TRC"),
restorative  justice  does  not  mean  doing  nothing,  but  it  may  mean
pursuing alternatives to criminal  prosecutions and civil trials.14 Hence,
to fulfill the aspiration  of building a bridge between the Apartheid era
and  the  vision  of  a  new  democratic  South  Africa,  the  TRC  held
hearings  to  give  victims  and  survivors  opportunities  to  tell  their
stories.  The  TRC  also  considered  applications  for  amnesty  from
perpetrators  of human rights violations, whether committed by police
and  government  officials or by freedom  fighters  and  resisters  of the
Apartheid  regime.  Some  critics  attacked  the  TRC  for  supplanting
criminal  prosecutions.15  Yet  still  others  opposed  the  TRC  and  its
hearings  because  they  would  reopen  old  wounds.  Judge  Richard
Goldstone of South Africa's Constitutional Court noted that he heard
such complaints from many white South Africans:
To whose wounds, I have wondered, are they referring?  Surely not their
own.  And, what makes  them think that  the  wounds  of the victims  have
healed? And  yet, when  I said  this to the  playwright  Ariel Dorfman,  he
corrected  me in  his always gentle and wise manner. He pointed out that
those white  South  Africans are  also victims  of apartheid.  Their discom-
fort with the truth is a symptom of their shame and that, too, makes them
victims.
16
Does  this  generous  view  from  South  Africa  warn  against  legal
responses  to  past  racial  injustice  in  America?  Those  who  favor
restorative justice  could argue that whites  along with  blacks need the
processes of social reconstruction  that  can emerge  after a community
faces  its past.  Criminal  prosecution  and  civil  litigation  can  also help
communities  face their past  and establish how the current generation
means  to  break  from  it.  Rather  than  reopening  old  wounds,  legal
attention  to  past  racial  crimes  could  start  the  process  of  healing
wounds  that have festered for decades. Even  the debate over whether
to proceed with  prosecutions, civil suits, or reparations can bring into
the open secrets about the past, afford people on all sides  a chance  to
tell the  truth, explain  their motivations  and  suffering,  apologize,  and
make amends.
14.  For  a  longer  discussion,  see  MARTHA  MINOW,  BETWEEN  VENGEANCE  AND
FORGIVENESS:  FACING  HISTORY  AFTER  GENOCIDE  AND  MASS  VIOLENCE  53-90  (1998)
[hereinafter MINOw,  BETWEEN  VENGEANCE  AND FORGIVENESS].
15.  See id. at 56, 81.
16.  Judge  Richard  Goldstone,  Foreword to  MINOW,  BETWEEN  VENGEANCE  AND
FORGIVENESS,  supra  note  14,  at  ix, xii; see also JAMES  BALDWIN,  THE  FIRE  NEXT TIME
(1963),  reprinted  in  JAMES  BALDWIN,  COLLECTED  ESSAYS  286  (1998)  (exploring  harms to
whites from white supremacy).
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Thus,  arguments  using  the  metaphor  of  "opening  old  wounds"
should not halt contemporary  efforts to pursue  legal  redress for past
racial  injustices. There is no risk of societal disorder  at the  level of a
civil war to cause hesitation in such pursuits. On the other hand, nor is
there  such  harmony  and  mutual  understanding  that  lawsuits  and
reparations  claims  arising from past race-based  injustices  could  fairly
be charged with introducing conflict to otherwise happy communities.
To the extent that whites as well  as blacks feel victimized  by the past,
attention and examination  would be better than doing nothing. Should
the lawsuits or reparations struggles prove controversial, the emerging
debates  themselves  offer  a chance  for  people  to  air  their  views and
learn  about the  views of others  on issues  that have enduring  signifi-
cance and consequences for future relationships and rules.
II.  BUT THE EVIDENCE IS STALE
An  obvious  objection  to litigation  proceeding  decades  after  the
underlying events occurred  is that the evidence  is stale, unreliable,  or
unavailable. The  truth-seeking  function  of trials  is jeopardized  when
evidence  is  absent  or  untrustworthy.  With  the  passage  of  time,
memories  may  become  foggy  or  influenced  by  intervening  events.
Documents  disappear.  Witnesses  die.  Concerns  about  weakness  in
evidence  underlie the statute of limitations that usually applies to any
claim. Statutes of limitations  also protect courts from excessive litiga-
tion and defendants  from endless uncertainty  about the possibility  of
future litigation.
As powerful  as these goals may be in most areas of law, they fade
in the context of gross violations  of human rights. In U.S. law, there is
no statute of limitations restricting prosecutions for murder. 7 There is
no statute  of limitations  on the  prosecution  and  punishment  of the
crime  of  genocide.'"  The  International  Criminal  Court  Statute
mandates that crimes within its jurisdiction "shall not be subject to any
statute  of limitations." 9  European  nations  have joined  a convention
17.  See MARYANNE  VOLLERS,  GHOSTS  OF  MISSISSIPPI:  THE  MURDER  OF  MEDGAR
EVERS,  THE  TRIALS  OF  BYRON  DE  LA  BECKWITH,  AND  THE  HAUNTING  OF  THE  NEW
SOUTH  (1995); Todd Taylor,  Exorcising the Ghosts of a Shameful Past: The Third Trial  and
Conviction of Byron de la  Beckwith, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 359 (1996).
18. Convention  on  the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to  War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, G.A.  Res. 2391,  U.N.  GAOR, 23rd  Sess.,  Supp. No. 18,  at 40,
U.N. Doc.  A17218  (1968)  (entered  into  force  Nov.  11,  1970),  available at http://157.150.
195.3/LibertyX::URd7xUuI5qE8QjU1V2QmZG8x;  see Matthew  Lippman,  Genocide: The
Crime of the Century:  The Jurisprudence  of Death at  the Dawn of the New  Millennium, 23
HOUS. J.  INT'L L. 467,488 (2001).
19.  Rome Statute of the International  Criminal Court, art. 29, July 17,  1998,  U.N.  Doc.
A/CONF.183/9,  37  I.L.M.  999  (entered  into  force  July  1,  2002),  available  at
http:llwww.unoorgllawlicclstatutelenglishlromestatute(e).pdf  (last visited Feb. 20,  2003); see
Diane  Marie  Amann  &  M.N.S.  Sellers,  The  United  States  of  America  and  the
International  Criminal  Court, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 381 (2002).
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exempting crimes  against humanity  as well  as genocide from statutes
of limitations. 2 0  These exemptions  from statutes  of limitations  reflect
the  recognition  that  some  offenses  are  so  serious  that  they  deserve
response whenever possible. They may also reflect the understanding
that loss of memory and evidence are less likely where the offenses are
extreme  and heinous. The French Criminal  Code, for example, adopts
the view that crimes against humanity  are "imprescriptible,"  meaning
both  exempt  from  the  statute  of  limitations  and  unforgettable.2
Although  it is  not uncontroversial  to exempt some matters from stat-
utes of limitations,22 doing so reflects the commitment that "justice, no
matter how late,  can and  will be served."'   Or, as  Lord David  Owen
quoted  Simon Wiesenthal  who, in  turn, attributed  Robert Kennedy,
"'Moral  duties have no term.' "24  Here,  as elsewhere, U.S.  law should
be informed by emerging international human rights ideas and accom-
plishments.'  The U.S.  thus  could  learn  from  emerging  international
norms  that set no  time limit on  the pursuit of justice  for gross viola-
tions of human rights.
Other considerations - such  as the pursuit of social reintegration
or reconciliation  - may support  the use of truth commissions  rather
than  criminal  prosecutions. 26  Concerns  about  the  passage  of  time,
20.  See Convention on the Non-Applicability of  Statutory Limitations to  War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, supra  note 18. The  United States is not a party to the Convention
on  Non-Applicability  of  Statutory  Limitations.  See  http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/
treaty6.htm  (last modified  Oct. 9,  2001)  (listing participants  and signatories to the  Conven-
tion).
21.  Vivian Grosswald Curran,  The Legalization of Racism in a Constitutional  State: De-
mocracy's  Suicide in Vichy France, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 74 & n.254 (1998); see C. PltN. ART.
213-5  (1994),  reprinted in  THE  FRENCH  PENAL  CODE  OF  1994  AS  AMENDED  AS  OF
JANUARY  1, 1999, at 93 (Edward  A. Tomlinson, trans., The American  Series of Foreign  Pe-
nal Codes No. 31,  1999).
22.  "The  issue of whether crimes against  humanity should be  without any  limitations  period
continues  to divide  France. One  of France's foremost  philosophers,  who was also a Jewish Resis-
tance hero,  answered  the question  resoundingly in the affirmative  in his  book, appropriately  enti-
tled L'Inprescriptible."  Curran, supra  note 21,  at 74 & n.254. (citing VLADIMIR JANKELEVITCH.
L'IMPRESCRIPTIBLE:  PARDONNER?  DANS  L'HONNEUR  ET LA  DIGNITE  (1986)).  For a French legal
scholar's similar conclusion, see Georges Levasseur, Les Crimes contre l'humanite et le probleme de
leur prescription.  93 J.  DE DROIT  INT'L 259,  273-86  (1966).  For a recent  discussion of the issue  in
the context of Paul Touvier's  trial,  see Leila  Sadat Wexler, Reflexions on the Trial of Vichy  Col-
laborator  Paul Touvier for Crimes Against Humanity in France,  20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY  191 (1995).
23.  Taylor, supra note  17,  at 379.
24.  Lord  David Owen, Reconciliation,  Applying Historical  Lessons to Modern Conflicts,
t9  FORDHAM  INT'L  LJ.  324,  329  (1995)  (citing  SIMON  WIESENTHAL,  JUSTICE  NOT
VENGEANCE  158 (1989)).
25.  See Yamamoto  et al., supra note 2.
26.  See  MINOW,  BETWEEN  VENGEANCE  AND  FORGIVENESS,  supra note  14,  at  55-89,
118-147;  Rose Weston, Note,  Facing  the Past, Facing the Future: Applying the Truth Com-
mission Model to the Historic  Treatment of Native Americans in the United States, 18 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP.  L.  1017 (2001).
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however, should not prevent  concerted  efforts to address  mass injus-
tices whose effects persist.
III. THE SCALE OF UNREMEDIED WRONGS COULD JEOPARDIZE
FAITH IN THE SYSTEMS  OF JUSTICE
I suspect that  implicit in objections  to legal redress for past  racial
crimes  and atrocities  is the fear of acknowledging  the extent of those
crimes and the resulting scope of official failure to prevent or respond.
Such acknowledgment would raise questions  about the legitimacy and
reliability  of  a  legal  system  intended  to  enact justice.  It  could  also
reveal the extent of reliance  upon and benefits from the past injustices
in the lives of people  who currently  feel innocent and indeed, did  not
themselves  commit the  atrocities. Reopening  past injustices  for  legal
treatment,  in  turn,  might  cast  doubt  on  the  legitimacy  of  current
allocations of power and privilege or call upon people to make amends
for conduct  of  others who are  long  gone. Resistance  to making such
amends  - and  assertions  that justice  does  not  so  demand  - may
reinforce opposition to efforts to litigate or pursue reparations for past
racial injustices.  Such resistance is summarized  in an aphorism  in the
United States: "After all, we can't give back Manhattan."' 27
Fair questions  can  be raised  about what  obligations  current  gen-
erations  do or  should  have  for  the  violations  of their  ancestors  or
those of their same race who preceded them. 28 Why should children  or
grandchildren  of wrongdoers  or bystanders  owe  any  duty to  remedy
their  ancestors'  failures?  Why  would  legal  rulings  pressing  such  an
obligation  rooted  in  the  past better  advance  justice  than  collective
actions designed to redress  present day inequities,  regardless  of their
provenance?  Yet  those  questions  do  not  themselves  justify  barring
lawsuits or  legislative investigations  into  past racial  injustice.  Deter-
mining  what  happened  is  a  vital  step  in  the  pursuit  of  justice;  it
precedes  but does not determine the  rationale  for or scope of reme-
dies, nor indeed, who specifically should be liable.
Some may worry that contemporary  use of courts in matters about
which  courts remained  silent for decades exposes the  vulnerability of
the judiciary to politics  and  prejudice. That  vulnerability  remains  all
too apparent to those who have waited long for justice. If the judiciary
becomes  active  now  in  allowing  hearings  of neglected  criminal  and
civil  complaints  from  decades  earlier,  it  can  start  to  rectify  its  own
failures  from  those  earlier  periods.  In so  doing, the  courts  can  help
establish reasons for current and  future generations  to lodge  faith  in
them. This is surely in the interests of whites, blacks, and members of
27.  See Weston, supra  note 26, at 1055 n.250.
28.  See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historic  Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4 (1992).
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other minority  groups.1 9 Yes, prosecutors  and  courts proceeding now
when  they  did  not  do  so  in  a  timely  fashion  will  expose  their  own
failures - or in  Marc Galanter's  image, the patches  and leaks in the
vase. But, he continues, "When  it comes to justice, we don't have the
choice of the unbroken  vase.  A patched  and blemished  world  is the
only  one we  can attain."'  Rather than dwell in the  broken shards of
justice, let us do the work of repair. The poignant and powerful essays
in this Colloquium are part of that important work.
29.  See Delgado, supra note 2.
30.  Galanter, supra note 1, at 124.
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